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FAMILY LAW—BREACH BABY: AN ARGUMENT FOR EQUAL
ENFORCEMENT OF TRADITIONAL AND GESTATIONAL
SURROGACY CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, doctors diagnosed Marcia Rosecky with leukemia for the second time.1 At the same time, Marcia and her husband David wanted to become parents and start a family.2 However, because of the disease and its
treatment, Marcia’s eggs were no longer viable.3 This prompted the
Roseckys to turn to longtime friend Monica Schissel, who offered to become a surrogate and carry a child for the couple.4 Monica and the Roseckys
obtained the advice of attorneys and executed a surrogacy contract styled a
“Parentage Agreement.”5 Soon after, Monica was artificially inseminated
with David’s sperm and became pregnant.6 Unexpectedly, a few weeks prior
to the birth of the child, Monica changed her mind and informed the
Roseckys that she intended to keep the baby.7 The Roseckys had chosen
Monica because she was a childhood friend of Marcia, and she had offered
to be Marcia’s surrogate multiple times.8 Even that close relationship did not
prevent the arrangement from souring.9
The outcome of the resulting dispute was anything but certain. Wisconsin courts had to decide if the state would enforce the contract between the
Roseckys and Monica Schissel.10 The issue was the genetic relationship between Monica and the baby.11 Nationally, enforcement of a surrogacy
agreement like the Roseckys’ is less certain than enforcement of one involv-

1. Scott Bauer, Supreme Court Upholds Surrogate Mother Agreements, STARTRIBUNE
(July 11, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.startribune.com/supreme-court-upholds-surrogatemother-agreements/215086311/.
2. Id.
3. Joshua J. Bryant, A Baby Step: The Status of Surrogacy Law in Wisconsin Following
Rosecky v. Schissel, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1729, 1741 (2015).
4. Id.
5. Rosecky v. Schissel, 833 N.W.2d 634, 637, 640 (Wis. 2013). The parentage agreement covered all the details of the surrogacy arrangement, including financial responsibilities,
a custody agreement and a parental rights termination clause. Id.
6. Bauer, supra note 1.
7. Rosecky, 833 N.W.2d at 637–38.
8. Id. at 638.
9. Id. at 639.
10. Id. at 639; Bryant, supra note 3, at 1740 (noting that the Roseckys’ case was one of
first impression in Wisconsin).
11. Rosecky, 833 N.W.2d at 646.
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ing a surrogate not genetically related to the child.12 Thus, the young couple
faced the real possibility that they might lose custody rights to the child they
had spent months thinking was theirs.13
Surrogacy law varies greatly from state to state.14 States that allow surrogacy still might not enforce the Roseckys’ contract, particularly with respect to the parental rights termination clause.15 Even states that allow surrogacy may distinguish between gestational surrogacy and traditional surrogacy. A gestational surrogate is not genetically related to the child she carries. In contrast, a traditional surrogate donates her own egg and is therefore
the child’s genetic mother, as was the case in Rosecky.16 In Rosecky, the
court ruled that it was against the state’s public policy to enforce a parental
rights termination clause against a surrogate who was genetically related to
the child.17 However, the court resolved the dispute in the Roseckys’ favor
by relying on the custody and placement provisions and the severability
clause.18 Had the dispute happened in another state, the court might not have
reached the questions of the custody and placement provision because of the
type of contract involved.19

12. Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on Gamete Donor Anonymity and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 291, 296 (2013).
13. See Rosecky, 833 N.W.2d at 646.
14. See Joseph F. Morrissey, Surrogacy: The Process, The Law, and The Contracts, 51
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 459, 487–503 (2015). See also, e.g., New Jersey Gestational Carrier
Agreement Act, 2018 N.J. Laws 18 (codified in part at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-60 to -68
(2020) and amending other scattered sections of N.J. STAT. ANN. Title 9 and N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:8-28); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.859 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (2019); N.Y.
DOM. REL. Law § 122 (Consol. 2019).
15. Morrissey, supra note 14, at 497–98 (describing North Dakota’s statute, “unique” in
distinguishing explicitly between traditional and gestational surrogacy; see also Rosecky, 833
N.W.2d at 652. The parental rights termination clause purported to control who, among the
parties to the contract, was to be the legal parent(s). Rosecky, 833 N.W.2d at 651. This issue
is probably the most important to the parties at the time of contracting. Id. However, it is also
the clause most often challenged when parties breach the agreement. Id.
16. Morrissey, supra note 14 at 472.
17. Rosecky, 833 N.W.2d at 652, 654.
18. Id. at 651, 653. The “parentage agreement” in Rosecky included a custody and
placement clause separate from the parental rights termination clause. Id. at 651. It also contained a severability clause. Id. The severability clause allowed the court to enforce remaining provisions in the contract in the event it found any clause unenforceable. Id. at 649. The
custody and placement clause were found to be enforceable even though the parental rights
could not automatically be terminated. Id. at 653.
19. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246–47 (N.J. 1987) (finding that the entire contract violated public policy), superseded in part by statute, New Jersey Gestational Carrier
Agreement Act, 2018 N.J. Laws 18.
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Courts and legislatures are generally moving toward enforcing the parties’ will in a gestational surrogacy contract.20 However, many of those same
states are hesitant to legitimize traditional surrogacy contracts.21 This note
argues that courts should enforce traditional surrogacy contracts in the same
manner as gestational surrogacy contracts. Part II provides a background of
the different genetic configurations that parties to surrogacy contracts can
enter into, including case examples where possible. Part III provides an
overview of the historical rationale for prohibiting surrogacy contracts generally and explores how these arguments apply with equal force to all four
possible permutations of the agreements. Part IV explains how courts have
departed from prior case law to enforce gestational surrogacy contracts
while still refusing to enforce all the provisions of traditional surrogacy contracts, then addresses the problems this approach creates. Part V argues that
courts should not treat traditional surrogacy contracts less favorably than
gestational surrogacy contracts. Part VI articulates three possible methods
for equal treatment of surrogacy contracts and argues for an intent-based
model for determining parentage that can work for all permutations of these
contracts.
II. THE FOUR TYPES OF SURROGACY CONTRACTS
There are four types of surrogacy contracts based on the genetic relationship of the parties to the intended child. The types as presented below
represent the possible configurations of genetic relationships between the
surrogate, one or both of the intended parents, and the child. This note will
first give an overview of possible genetic relationships among parties to
gestational contracts. It will then compare parties’ relationships in traditional contracts to their more readily enforceable gestational counterparts.
A.

Type 1 Gestational Contracts

Perhaps the archetype of gestational surrogacy is where both intended
parents are genetically related to the child. Such was the case in Johnson v.
Calvert.22 In Calvert, the intended mother had undergone a hysterectomy,
but her ovaries remained capable of producing viable eggs. 23 Likewise, her
20. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); 2018 N.J. Laws 18. N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 122. This note assumes that the trend of enforcing the will of the parties in
gestational surrogacy arrangements is generally a good thing.
21. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234, superseded in part by statute, New Jersey Gestational Carrier Agreement Act, 2018 N.J. Laws 18. The holding barring enforcement of
traditional surrogacy contracts is still good authority.; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122
22. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 777–78.
23. Id. at 778.
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husband was fertile.24 They only needed someone to provide gestational
services for a zygote fertilized in a lab using each of their genetic material.25
Another possibility with this first permutation of gestational contracts is that
only one intended parent may be genetically related to the child. Such was
the case in C.M. v. M.C.26 In C.M., a single intended father had the sole genetic connection with the resulting children.27 The court enforced the agreement because the intended father substantially complied with the statutory
scheme governing surrogacy contracts.28
B.

Type 2 Gestational Contracts

The second type of gestational contract is one where no party to the
contract is genetically related to the resulting child.29 In In re Marriage of
Buzzanca, after the dissolution of the intended parents’ marriage, a trial
court took the extraordinary step of declaring that the child had no legal
parents.30 Buzzanca saw a surrogacy contract with no genetic relationship
between the child and any party to the contract fall apart when the Buzzanca
marriage dissolved. 31 Neither the intended father nor the surrogate wanted
the child.32 The courts confronted this issue: absent any genetic connection
between the child and any party to the contract, who is the legal parent?33
The appellate court ruled legal parentage belonged to the intended parents.34
The intent of the parties governed this case even in the absence of a genetic
connection between the intended parents and the child.35

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See C.M. v. M.C., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d 351, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). California’s
statutory scheme recognizes all gestational surrogacy contracts without regard to which intended parent(s) are genetically linked to the child and enforces them as long as they substantially comply with the procedures required by the law. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (Deering
2020).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 360–61.
29. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
30. Id. (In re Buzzanca was decided prior to the passage of the statutory scheme codifying the enforcement of gestational surrogacy. The trial court reasoned that the lack of any
genetic connection to either the surrogate or the intended parents left the child legally parentless).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 293–94.
35. In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293.
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Type 1 Traditional Surrogacy Contracts

As with gestational contracts, there are two types of traditional contracts with respect to genetic relationships. The facts of Rosecky describe the
first type: the child born pursuant to the contract was genetically related to
both the surrogate and the intended father.36 The court remanded the case to
the trial court to give custody to the intended parents unless enforcement
would be against the best interest of the child, resulting in an outcome similar to the expected result in a gestational surrogacy contract dispute.37 However, there was no termination of parental rights pursuant to the contract.38 It
may be best to think of this as a form of substantial performance.39 In the
context of a surrogacy contract, the material term may be the one providing
for legal custody, not termination of parental rights. If the point of the contract is for the intended parents to gain the opportunity to raise a child, then
legal and physical custody become the most important terms of the contract.
It is therefore possible to accomplish the goal of the intended parents by
enforcing the custody and placement clauses, even with the surrogate retaining her claim as a legal parent.
While substantial performance by enforcing the custody provision
might be possible under a traditional surrogacy contract, it is by no means
guaranteed.40 Consider the case of In re Marriage of Moschetta. Robert
Moschetta occupied essentially the same position as David Rosecky. 41 Like
in Rosecky, Mr. Moschetta was genetically related to the child and so was
the surrogate.42 Upon dissolution of the Moschetta marriage, the surrogate
attempted to have the court declare her to be the child’s mother.43 The trial
court found the legal parents to be the surrogate and Robert Moschetta.44
The trial court awarded essentially a 50/50 split in the custody arrangement
on a best-interest-of-the-child rationale.45 In The decision, the appellate
court recognized that as a consequence of its holding, it is difficult to know

36. See Rosecky v. Schissel, 833 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Wis. 2013).
37. Id. at 653.
38. Id. at 651 (reasoning the contractual termination of parental rights in this way was
against public policy.).
39. See CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
815–16 (8th ed. 2016). Substantial performance is where a deviation from the terms of a
contract exists, but the deviation is relatively minor and therefore not a material breach. Id.
40. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
41. Id. at 895; Rosecky, 833 N.W.2d at 637.
42. In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 901 (awarding joint custody despite some concerns regarding the surrogate’s
home).
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the outcome of a potential dispute when a traditional surrogacy contract is
involved.46
D.

Type 2 Traditional Surrogacy Contracts

Type 2 traditional surrogacy contracts involve a surrogate using her
own egg and the sperm of an anonymous donor. There does not appear to be
any published case law addressing this possible combination. Given the uncertainty surrounding a type 1 traditional surrogacy,47 the intended parents in
a type 2 traditional surrogacy contract may face even less certain parental
rights.48 If that is the case, it is unsurprising that these fact patterns are rare.49
III. HISTORICAL REASONS FOR INVALIDATING SURROGACY AGREEMENTS
AND HOW THEY APPLY TO EACH KIND OF CONTRACT
Anytime a new technology develops, the legal system must answer the
question, does the technology fit into our current legal scheme? With respect to surrogacy agreements, courts have wrestled with this issue on several grounds.50 Historically, courts have found surrogacy contracts invalid
because (1) they are against the public policy of the state, (2) there is concern that inherent coercion undermines the surrogate mothers’ voluntary
consent, (3) there is a perception that the surrogate mother is unable to understand the full extent of the contract, and (4) they violate existing adoption
or baby-selling statutes.51
A.

The Public Policy Argument

Courts have historically considered public policy when deciding the
validity of a contract.52 The first court to address the validity of a surrogacy
46. Id. at 903. While what the court says here is true, the circumstances that are highlighted for the trial court to consider implicate a problem that will be discussed in detail later
in this paper. Specifically, the appellate court noted the trial court should consider the surrogate’s son’s potential involvement with drugs and gangs when it reviews the best interest of
the child. Id. at 902–03. Resolving parentage disputes arising from surrogacy agreements in
this way raises the specter of exploitation that is addressed in Section III.
47. In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903.
48. Absent a statute that gives intended parents relief, they may occupy a position as a
third party and lack standing to even challenge a surrogate’s decision to keep the child.
49. The use of genetics as a presumption instead of enforcing the will of the parties may
result in unappealing consequences should this fact pattern come before the court. See infra
Section IV.
50. See Jessica H. Munyon, Note, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract: The Erosion
of Female Autonomy in Surrogacy Decisions, 36 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 717, 719 (2003).
51. See id.
52. KNAPP, supra note 39, at 661.
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agreement decided the case on public policy grounds.53 In re Baby M involved a traditional surrogacy contract not unlike the one at issue in
Rosecky.54 The intended parents (the Sterns) paid the surrogate (Whitehead)
to be artificially inseminated and to carry a child that would be theirs.55 After the child was born, Whitehead initially surrendered the child but then
reconsidered. After gaining the Sterns’ permission to spend a week with the
child, Whitehead announced she was keeping the baby.56 The court invalidated the contract for the dual reasons of conflicting with the laws and public policy of the state.57
In determining that public policy weighed against the validity of the
contract, the Baby M court noted that the interests in the contract extended
beyond those of the parties to the agreement.58 Additionally, the court concluded that New Jersey’s statutory scheme showed a clear preference that a
child be “brought up with both natural parents.”59 The Baby M court determined the parties acted in their own self-interest and did not (nor could they)
adequately consider the child’s interests at the execution of the contract.60
Moreover, the court reasoned that money was Ms. Whitehead’s primary
motive for entering into the agreement giving up her parental rights.61 The
court asserted that such an agreement was against the public policy of keeping natural parents with their children.62
Public policies of keeping children with their “natural parents” and determining the best interest of the child are no less relevant to a gestational
surrogacy contract than to the traditional surrogacy contract at issue in Baby
M.63 In A.H.W. v. G.H.B., the court confronted a situation where both in53. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246–47 (N.J. 1987), superseded in part by statute,
New Jersey Gestational Carrier Agreement Act, 2018 N.J. Laws 18.
54. Id. at 1234; Rosecky v. Schissel, 833 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Wis. 2013).
55. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234–35.
56. Steven M. Recht, Note, “M” is for Money: Baby M and the Surrogate Motherhood
Controversy, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1013, 1035 (1988).
57. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234. The court stated that the purpose of the adoption
statutes that bar paying money to a child’s mother was to protect both the child and mother.
Id. at 1241–42.
58. Id. at 1248; see also Munyon, supra note 50, at 732–33. A child conceived pursuant
to a surrogacy contract can, and probably should, be viewed as a third-party beneficiary.
59. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1246–47.
60. Id. at 1248 (viewing the contract more as one for goods, i.e. “the baby,” than one for
the services of gestation).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1246–47.
63. A.H.W. v G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). The court
opines on the importance not just of genetics, but the process of carrying a baby itself. Id.
The “endocrine cascade” and nutrient exchanges, among other things, appear to support that
there is an interest that the state’s public policy is meant to protect beyond the genetic connection of a natural mother and child. Id.
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tended parents were genetically related to the child.64 Unlike the traditional
surrogate in Baby M, the gestational carrier in A.H.W. was not fighting for
the child and instead joined the intended parents in a motion to terminate her
own parental rights in a pre-birth order.65 However, the court cited important
developments that happen at birth to support the policy that a woman could
not be forced to surrender her child and that she must wait seventy-two
hours after birth to voluntarily do so.66
B.

The Possibility of Exploitation: Baby M and Feminists Agree

Another argument against surrogacy contracts is the potential for exploitation of the would-be surrogates.67 Proponents of this argument fear
compensation paid to surrogates will be a coercive force ushering women
into a situation where their bodies become commodities.68 Some liken the
surrogacy contract to prostitution of the womb.69 Feminist scholar Andrea
Dworkin argues that the surrogate is not able to express her own will adequately due to power structures inherent in surrogacy agreements that favor
the male party.70 Taken to its logical conclusion, Dworkin’s argument implies that enforcing surrogacy agreements reduce women to nothing more
than their reproductive capacity.71
Dworkin’s argument carries equal force with both traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts. It stands to reason that a primary concern (if not
the determining factor) when choosing a surrogate is her ability to carry the
child to term, whether or not she supplies the egg. 72 Additionally, from a
socioeconomic standpoint, the type of surrogacy contract likely has little
bearing on who becomes a surrogate.73 No matter the type of contract, intended parents have an incentive to find someone not only willing to perform the service, whether or not for money, but also least likely to keep the
child. Given the possibility of a dispute arising with a surrogate claiming
64. Id. at 949.
65. Id. at 953.
66. Id. at 954 (The term “natural parent” as used in Baby M. and the public policy concerns raised in that case are therefore relevant even when the surrogate lacks a genetic connection to the child.).
67. Recht, supra note 56, at 1024–25.
68. Connor Cory, Note, Access and Exploitation: Can Gay Men and Feminists Agree on
Surrogacy Policy?, 23 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 133, 146 (2015).
69. ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT WING WOMEN 182–88 (1983) (articulating two economic
models of male control over women, the farming model and the prostitution model, surrogacy
fitting into the latter and, at least arguably, both models).
70. Id. at 182–83.
71. See id. at 187.
72. See id. at 187–88.
73. See Recht, supra note 56, at 1024 (discussing role of class in surrogacy arrangements).
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parenthood under presumptions of birth, genetics, or both, intended parents
may seek potential surrogates that would be at a severe disadvantage in a
determination of the best-interests-of-the-child.74
Scholars have also advanced comparisons to human trafficking as an
argument against surrogacy contracts.75 Their premise is that surrogacy is no
more than black market adoption.76 However, this argument ignores the fact
that the intent of the parties is different with a surrogacy contract than it is
with an adoption.77 In a surrogacy contract, the parties are contracting not
for a fully formed baby but the services to create one.78 Therefore, the concerns are wholly different than those present in an adoption.
Similar to the prostitution argument, the human trafficking argument
applies equally to all surrogacy contracts, regardless of the genetic relationship between the child and the parties. The purpose of the transaction is important here.79 No matter the genetic relationship of the parties to the child,
the purpose of the contract is to secure the services required to bring the
child into existence, not the child itself.80
C.

The Impossibility of Informed Consent

Opponents argue that a surrogate mother cannot give informed consent
because she cannot predict how strong her bond with the resulting child will
be.81 At least one court has explicitly viewed hormonal and emotional
changes during pregnancy and shortly after birth as a justification not to
enforce a surrogacy contract.82 The court in A.H.W. confronted a situation
where the surrogate had previously given birth to a child of her own and was
actually willing to surrender the child under the surrogacy contract.83 However, the court held she could not surrender the child until seventy-two hours
74. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 902–03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
The surrogate’s family issues in Moschetta may be used against her. Knowing this, intended
parents may intentionally seek out people who are likely to lose should they challenge custody.
75. Jennifer S. White, Gestational Surrogacy Contracts in Tennessee: Freedom of Contract Concerns & Feminist Principles in the Balance, 2 BELMONT L. REV. 269, 295 (2015).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1987), superseded in part by statute, New
Jersey Gestational Carrier Agreement Act, 2018 N.J. Laws 18; Munyon, supra note 50, at
719.
82. A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (discussing
the endocrine cascade and its importance not just to the child but to the mother’s bond as
well).
83. Id.
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after birth.84 The court justified its decision in part because, at birth, the
mother may still develop a bond with the child.85 Though the A.H.W surrogate had previously been pregnant and likely knew and understood the emotional attachments involved, the court fashioned its rule to protect a woman
who had no idea what the process would be like.86
A.H.W. concerned a gestational contract.87 However, there is little difference in the concerns the court noted when a traditional surrogacy contract
is at issue. This is because the biological processes are identical regardless
of the genetic connection.88 No matter what the source of the genetic material, the womb provides the same function.89 The surrogate does not serve as a
mere incubator.90 The surrogate provides the nutrients, proper hormones for
brain development, and a protective immune system during critical stages in
development.91 The surrogate’s body, by supplying all the necessary building materials to create the baby, provides at least implicit support for the
holding in A.H.W., no matter the genetic relationship between surrogate and
baby.92
D.

Statutory Barriers to Enforcement

Finally, statutory barriers to the enforcement of surrogacy contracts exist in many states.93 The courts in Baby M, A.H.W., and a host of other cases
were not working off a blank slate, even when the issue was one of first impression.94 Adoption statutes often state that a mother cannot terminate her
parental rights by agreeing to adoption until a certain time after the birth.95

84. Id. at 954.
85. Id. at 953–54 (denying a pre-birth order to terminate the parental rights of the surrogate on the basis of endocrine changes that happen up to and immediately following birth).
86. See id.
87. Id. at 953.
88. See R. Brian Oxman, Maternal-Fetal Relationships and Nongenetic Surrogates, 33
JURIMETRICS J. 387, 389 (1993).
89. See id. at 394.
90. Id.; A.H.W., 772 A.2d at 953. The court acknowledges Oxman’s point. Id. The gestational mother contributes significantly to the development of the child such that two genetically identical zygotes carried in different women would develop to be different human
beings. Id. See also Oxman, supra note 88, at 394.
91. Oxman, supra note 88, at 395.
92. See id.; see also A.H.W., 772 A.2d at 953.
93. Munyon, supra note 50, at 719.
94. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988), superseded in part by
statute, New Jersey Gestational Carrier Agreement Act, 2018 N.J. Laws 18; A.H.W., 772
A.2d at 954.
95. See, e.g., A.H.W., 772 A.2d at 954 (discussing New Jersey adoption statute allowing
parental rights terminations no sooner than seventy-two hours after birth).
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Likewise, statutes prohibiting the exchange of money in exchange for a termination of parental rights may invalidate surrogacy agreements.96
The primary goals of adoption statutes are consistency and security of
the minor children.97 However, adoption statutes provide inadequate guidance in dealing with any type of surrogacy contract. Unlike in an adoption,
in surrogacy situations the child in question would not exist but for the intent of the parties to enter the contract, regardless of the genetic relationship
between the child and the parties to the contract.98 Likewise, statutes that
prohibit selling children do not directly apply to any type of surrogacy contract because the payments are expressly not for the child but to reimburse
for expenses and pain and suffering during pregnancy.99
IV. STATES DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND GESTATIONAL
SURROGACY, CREATING PROBLEMS
The opposition to enforcing surrogacy contracts stems from the context
of a traditional surrogacy,100 but gestational surrogacy contracts have been
better received in some courts.101 Gestational surrogacy is different because
the child is not genetically related to the surrogate.102 However, this approach creates additional problems, such as how to apply competing presumptions of parentage in potential mothers.103
A.

The Calvert Rule: The Inefficiency of Competing Presumptions

California was the first state to recognize a surrogacy contract as enforceable in Johnson v. Calvert.104 In Calvert, the court applied the presump-

96. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240. If one views the transaction as the purchase of a
human being, the statute will apply regardless of genetic consanguinity. Likewise, if the
contract is seen as one not for a human being but for gestational services, such a statute
would not apply regardless of consanguinity. The purpose of the contract really matters here.
97. See Susanna Birdsong, Comment, Voiding Motherhood: North Carolina’s Shortsighted Treatment of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Boseman v. Jarrell, 21 AM. U.J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 109, 122–23 (2012).
98. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
99. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993).
100. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
101. See, e.g., Calvert, 851 P.2d at 777. But see A.H.W., 772 A.2d at 953 (refusing to
enforce gestational surrogacy contract).
102. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 784.
103. Presumptions of parentage are legal fictions created to assist in determining paternity. Normally these would not apply to mothers because it is obvious who the mother is. With
surrogacy, however, there are often two competing claims of motherhood. Applying a set of
presumptions on the surface is an easy way to settle the dispute.
104. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 784–85.
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tions of birth and genetics as stated in California’s parentage act.105 The
court explains the act was passed to determine parent-child relationships
when such relationships are in dispute.106 The act states maternity may be
established by giving birth.107 The act also allows for provisions applicable
to fathers to be used in determining maternity where practicable.108 The
court reasoned that the genetic presumption of paternity was relevant to determining maternity as well.109 The Johnsons had the genetic presumption in
their favor, and their surrogate naturally had the birth presumption.110 The
statute did not expressly say which presumption to weigh more heavily, so
the court weighted each equally and looked for a tiebreaker.111 The court
settled on the parties’ intent as the tiebreaker that determined legal
parenthood when genetic relationship and the birth presumption are not
vested in the same woman. Thus, the court enforced the agreement against
the surrogate.112
Using the intent of the parties as a tiebreaker only when the genetic
presumption and birth presumption are not present in the same woman can
only resolve disputes in two out of the four types of surrogacy contacts. As
California courts have noted, the rule can resolve conflicts in both possible
types of gestational contracts.113 However, the rule is not applicable to either
type of traditional surrogacy contract.114 With traditional surrogacy, the surrogate will always possess both presumptions.

105. Id. at 781–82.
106. Id. at 779.
107. Id. at 780.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 781.
110. Calvert, 851 P.2d. at 779–81.
111. Id. at 789 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the majority by characterizing their solution as an “ill-advised” tiebreaker, rather than considering the best interests of
the child. Id. However, the majority noted that the intent of the parents as evidenced by such
contracts will often be coterminous with the best interest of the child. Id. at 783.
112. Id. at 786.
113. Id.; In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) In re
Buzzanca confronts the possibility that no one is genetically related to the child, and therefore
no competing presumption exists. However, the decision stands for the proposition that when
the child is created pursuant to a contract and that child is not genetically related to the surrogate, intent controls.
114. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). The
court construed the holding in Calvert to limit it to gestational contracts because California’s
Parentage Act expressly covers a traditional surrogacy. Id. This creates its own problem
where intended parents have an incentive to find a traditional surrogate who could not win a
custody dispute on a best-interest-of-the-child standard.
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The Calvert/Moschetta Dichotomy and Inadequate Legislative Efforts

There are two potential problems a court could face using the Calvert
rule. First, a surrogate may decide to keep the child and the intended parents
would have no claim to parentage unless the intended parents are genetically
related to the child. Second, the Calvert rule leaves open the possibility of
intended parents doing precisely what the intended parents in Buzzanca attempted to do, leaving the surrogate as the only legal parent.115
California seems to have recognized this possibility and added a provision to their family code to address the weakness left open in Calvert.116
However, while the provision does establish a claim to a parent-child relationship for all types of intended parents, the provision does nothing to clarify what the ultimate outcome of a dispute should be.117 California’s surrogacy statute codifies that the intended parents are the sole legal parents of a
gestational contract, but it does not address traditional surrogacy, likely
leaving the reasoning in Moschetta to control the outcome of traditional
contracts in dispute.118
Other legislatures have distinguished the gestational carrier agreement
and passed bills to enforce such contracts.119 Yet some of these same states
either have laws specifically outlawing traditional surrogacy120 or case law
that still prevents the enforcement of a traditional surrogacy contract.121
Many other states have legislation and case law that fail to articulate clearly
if or how courts should distinguish between the two types of surrogacy contracts.122 This situation creates uncertainty for both intended parents and
115. In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284. Because all the usual presumptions of parentage are vested in the surrogate and potentially her spouse, the intended parents may occupy a position of a third party. With no genetic connection between the intended parents and
the child, the court would need to fashion a rule specific to this type of surrogacy contract.
116. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (Deering 2020).
117. See id.
118. Id. § 7962; In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (holding intent only governed in a gestational contract). Because the statute does not
factor in intent for traditional surrogacy the way it does with gestational surrogacy, the reasoning of the Moschetta court is likely still good law.
119. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-08 (2019); New Jersey Gestational Carrier Agreement
Act, 2018 N.J. Laws 18 (codified in part at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-60 to -68 (2020) and
amending other scattered sections of N.J. STAT. ANN. Title 9 and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-28).
120. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05.
121. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988), superseded in part by statute,
New Jersey Gestational Carrier Agreement Act, 2018 N.J. Laws 18 (Holding has been superseded only with respect to gestational surrogacy contracts where surrogate is not genetically
related to the child.).
122. Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A State-by-State Survey of
Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 454
(2009).
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potential surrogates. States can easily avoid this uncertainty if they determine their surrogacy policy and provide a clear statement on how the enforcement should be adjudicated.
V. SURROGACY CONTRACTS SHOULD BE ENFORCED EQUALLY WITHOUT
REGARD TO GENETICS
The enforcement, or lack of enforcement, of both traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts should be equal. Courts should adjudicate disputes without regard to the genetic connection between the parties and the
resulting children. Doing so will better address the government’s interest
than the current regime of treating the contracts differently based upon the
parties’ genetic relationship to the child.
A.

Public Policy Is Best Served by Treating Traditional and Gestational
Contracts Equally

Distinguishing enforcement of surrogacy contracts based on genetics
might seem appropriate for a public policy that seeks to ensure children are
kept with their “natural parents.”123 However, this legislative and judicial
scheme ignores the fact that a gestational surrogate is more than an EasyBake Oven.124 The child gets integral parts of its structure, brain development and other features not just from the genes encoded at conception, but
also from the endocrine cascade from the gestational carrier.125 From the
perspective of biology, traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts are
more alike than courts admit.
Additionally, the disfavored treatment of traditional surrogacy contracts relative to their gestational counterparts minimizes an important aspect of considering the best interest of the child as compared to a gestational
carrier.126 Protecting equally the interests of parties to traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts recognizes that the interest of the child is the
same whether that child is born pursuant to a traditional or gestational surrogate, and that this interest is best served by clear rules regarding equal

123. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1246–47.
124. Oxman, supra note 88, at 394.
125. Id. at 398. The endocrine cascade is the series of hormones, vital to a baby’s development, which is provided by a pregnant woman.
126. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (noting the importance of intentionally entering into the creation of a child.); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d
280, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing importance of intent to parent). Interests of the
child and the interests of parents who intend from the outset to conceive and raise that child
are often significantly correlated. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 783.
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enforcement.127 It follows that if courts enforce the intent of a gestational
contract as good public policy, the enforcement of the intent of a traditional
surrogacy contract would likewise be good public policy.
B.

Equal Enforcement of Surrogacy Contracts Would Reduce Exploitation

One criticism of surrogacy is that the power difference between the
parties is so great that the contracts are exploitative by their very nature.128
As noted earlier, surrogacy is sometimes compared to prostitution.129 While
this criticism is perhaps not unfounded, equal enforcement will decrease the
possibility of exploitation, reducing both the coercive impact of surrogacy
contract and the incentive to seek disadvantaged surrogates.
1.

Reducing the Coercive Impact of Surrogacy Contracts

Equal enforcement of surrogacy contracts will reduce the possibility of
exploitation of surrogate mothers. Money, not the genetic connection to the
child, makes the contract potentially exploitative.130 Poorer women are most
susceptible to the promise of potentially large fees (relative to their assets or
earning power).131 The burdens placed on the surrogate are nearly identical
whether the egg is theirs or not.132 If any difference is present, it is that gestational surrogacy, the more acceptable type of surrogacy contract, requires
more extensive medical procedures.133 Equal enforcement of traditional and
gestational surrogacy contracts will reduce the coercive aspects of the contracts by giving surrogates some choice in the type of arrangement they enter. If the surrogate knows what she can expect when considering whether to
assist the intended parents, she is free to choose between using her own egg
or submitting to more extensive medical intervention.

127. Melissa Ruth, Enforcing Surrogacy Agreements in the Courts: Pushing for an Intent-Based Standard, 63 VILL .L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 1, 18 (2018) (Allowing a surrogate to
change her mind until sometime after the birth of the child is not in the best interest of the
child; rather it is in the child’s best interest that parentage is known at birth.).
128. See Dworkin, supra note 69, at 182–88.
129. Id. at 187–88.
130. Cory, supra note 68, at 155.
131. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 942, 1028 (1986).
132. Recht, supra note 56, at 1025 (noting behavioral restrictions, medical visits, and the
risk of complications, all common to every surrogacy.).
133. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(noting that traditional surrogacy is easier and less expensive); see also Boardwine v. Bruce,
88 Va. Cir. 218, 219 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014) (describing an “artificial insemination” performed at
home with no medical intervention whatsoever). Such a simple approach is not possible with
a gestational surrogate.

142

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW
2.

[Vol. 43

Reducing the Incentive to Seek Disadvantaged Surrogates

Equal enforcement reduces the incentive to seek out disadvantaged
women who are likely to lose in a custody battle. The less enforceable traditional surrogacy contracts still result in the birth of a child, and courts must
consider that child’s best interest.134 If traditional surrogacy contracts are
unenforceable, or enforceable only after a period of time post-birth,135 intended parents have an incentive to seek out a surrogate who is less able to
care for the resulting child even if she wanted to. Courts would then need to
conduct a best-interest-of-the-child analysis absent considerations stemming
from the contract, like the court did in Moschetta.136 The primary caretaker
doctrine137 is pertinent here because an infant needs a much greater degree of
care by the parent for its development than an older child.138 This means that
intended parents would be best served by seeking out women who would
have difficulty providing the care that an infant needs. If courts enforced
intent in traditional surrogacy as they enforce it in gestational contracts, the
incentive to exploit disadvantaged women would be largely reduced, if not
altogether eliminated. Additionally, the surrogate is protected because she
knows that the contract is enforceable against the intended parents.
C.

Equal Enforcement of Surrogacy Contracts Promotes Judicial
Efficiency

Equal enforcement of traditional surrogacy contracts will streamline
the judicial process and provide better guidance to both intended parents and
potential surrogates. Such streamlining is in the best interest of the children
born of these agreements.139 As litigation ensues, the child is bonding with
134. See In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 902–03 (remanding to trial court to determine the best interest of the child without considering the surrogacy contract).
135. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 814(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
136. See In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903; In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 828
(Tenn. 2014).
137. See Kathryn L. Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making—How
Judges Use the Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 5 (1998) (“The primary caretaker standard focuses on and awards
custody to the parent who provided the physical care and socialization for the child, provided
he or she is a fit parent.”).
138. See id. With a newborn, a surrogate who would require greater degrees of assistance
with the daily needs of the child would be at a severe disadvantage in a custody battle with
intended parents who are more able to care for the child’s needs themselves.
139. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n.10 (Cal. 1993) (noting children born pursuant to any type of surrogacy contract are not served by potentially protracted litigation to
determine parentage). One additional consideration: by signing the agreement, the surrogate
has at least arguably conceded that granting custody to the intended parents is in the best
interest of the child. Id.
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someone.140 That person is becoming the child’s psychological parent in the
midst of what may be a long litigation process.141 If a court later determines
that the child’s best interest would be best served by a party other than the
primary custodian who took care of the child during the dispute, it follows
that at least some harm will come to the child due to being removed from
that psychological parent.142
Equal enforcement benefits the parties to the contract as well. Forum
shopping is an unfortunate side-effect of inconsistent surrogacy laws.143 The
inconsistencies that exist from one state to another are somewhat outside the
scope of this note, other than to suggest that states can address a significant
part of the forum-shopping problem by creating a policy that treats gestational and traditional surrogacy contracts equally.
VI. THE THREE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE EQUAL ENFORCEMENT
PROBLEM
Equal enforcement of traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts is
appropriate because the contracts contain little factual difference in their
terms and implicate the same policy considerations. Enforcing them differently creates additional problems the court must solve. Equal enforcement
could take one of three possible models: (1) states could declare all surrogacy contracts unenforceable or illegal;144 (2) states could enforce the parties’
intent to its full extent;145 or (3) states could substantially enforce the surrogacy agreements by enforcing the intent of the parties with respect to the
custody and placement provisions but not terminate parental rights as an
operation of law.146

140. Mercer, supra note 137, at 6.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 7.
143. Brett Thomaston, Comment, A House Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand: The
Need to Federalize Surrogacy Contracts as a Result of a Fragmented State System, 49 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1155, 1178 (2016).
144. See N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-05 (Lexis Advance through all acts approved by the
governor through the end of the 2019 Regular Legislative Session); See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 122 (Consol. 2019). New York amended its surrogacy law to allow for only gestational
surrogacy contracts beginning February 15, 2021. This invites the very confusion this note
has pointed out exists in other states. It is at least arguable that this is not an improvement
because of the issues discussed earlier in this note.
145. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 777–78 (Cal. 1993) (upholding the trial
court’s termination of parental rights pursuant to the agreement).
146. See Rosecky v. Schissel, 833 N.W.2d 634, 653–54 (Wis. 2013).
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A.

Declaring Surrogacy Unenforceable or Illegal: The Least Beneficial
Approach

Of the three options, not enforcing the contracts is the most problematic. States that merely declare the contracts unenforceable will still have to
decide custody, placement, and parentage for surrogate-born children.147
Determining the best interest of the child on a case-by-case basis, with no
other guidance, may result in a child being removed from his or her psychological parent. A state using this approach must accept that it will harm
some children by litigating this way.
It is within a state’s right to criminalize entering into surrogacy contracts under its police power.148 While that certainly is a deterrent, this approach does not account for the children of those that choose to enter into
these agreements anyway, and it may arguably may do more harm by imposing criminal sanctions on the child’s parents. Although likely the least
beneficial option, criminal sanctions for entering surrogacy contracts do
provide the kind of clear statement of policy that is so needed in this area of
the law.149
B.

Full Enforcement: Terminating Surrogates’ Parental Rights as an Operation of Law

Any intended parent would prefer full enforcement of surrogacy
agreements, including the parental rights termination clause. This approach
has the advantage of ensuring the child is with the party who intended to
raise it.150 Additionally, it is the most judicially efficient in that intended
parents should be able to obtain a pre-birth order so long as the procedures
are followed.151
While this approach is the most advantageous for the intended parents,
enforcing the contracts in this way does little to protect a surrogate’s unique
interests. While protections could be in place to limit the possibility of unin-

147. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS §722.861 (2019). The
language of both statutes indicates the courts would engage in the typical custody dispute
proceedings.
148. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.859 (2019).
149. See Hofman, supra note 122, at 454.
150. See Calvert, 851 P.2d at 782 (quoting John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be
a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353
(1991)) ((noting that the “prime mover” is the intended parent in surrogacy). At the preconception stage, the surrogate has no intent to raise the child absent the possibility of deception that would amount to fraud.
151. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(f)(2) (Deering 2020).
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tended emotional attachments,152 the process all surrogates go through, regardless of genetic connection to the child, has profound influence on both
child and surrogate.153 Enforcing the contracts equally in this way is a step in
the right direction, but it may not present the proper balance of interests.
C.

Substantial Performance: The Balanced Approach

What this note describes as substantial performance, if applied equally,
presents the most desirable balance of considering the best interest of the
children, the expectation interest of the intended parents, and the interests of
the surrogates. Substantial performance in this context recognizes that the
point of a surrogacy contract is to allow the intended parents the opportunity
to raise a child. This goal can be accomplished without an automatic termination of the surrogate’s parental rights so long as custody is placed with the
intended parents from birth. By giving automatic effect to the custody and
placement provisions of both types of contracts, the court preserves the intended parents’ goal of raising a child.154 Such a solution likewise respects
the best interest of the children by placing them in the custody of the party
who always wanted them.155 The Rosecky case provides a template for how
the approach should work.156
Moreover, the court’s reluctance to automatically terminate the surrogate’s parental rights will protect the surrogate’s interest. This also goes
toward the best interest of the child by giving the surrogate standing, not
only in contract law but also in family law, to pursue increased visitation157
or even gain an award of primary custody.158 Giving the surrogate the ability
to seek visitation or custody advances the best interest of the child in at least
two ways. First, visitation exposes the child to another adult who will love
and care for them. Second, it acknowledges the possibility of the occasional
152. See, e.g., New Jersey Gestational Carrier Agreement Act, 2018 N.J. Laws 18 (codified in part at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-60 to -68 (2020) and amending other scattered sections of N.J. STAT. ANN. Title 9 and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-28).
153. A.H.W. v G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); see generally
Oxman, supra note 88.
154. See generally Rosecky v. Schissel, 833 N.W.2d 634 (Wis. 2013). The point of a
surrogacy contract is for a couple to have a child that they can raise as their own. At minimum, the expectation of the intended parents is to have physical and legal custody.
155. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 782.
156. See generally Rosecky, 833 N.W.2d 634.
157. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000). If parental rights are terminated,
whether voluntarily or by operation of law, the surrogate would occupy the position of a third
party and thus lack standing to sue for visitation.
158. Such an award should only be available if the surrogate can make a showing of
unfitness of the intended parents. By placing the burden on the surrogate to show not her
fitness but the unfitness of the intended parents, there would be little reason to seek out a
surrogate that might be judged unfit if a dispute arose.
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intended parent turning out to be unfit. It gives the surrogate a chance to
obtain custody instead of having the child either stay in the unfit home or
end up in the foster system.
The substantial enforcement approach also has the advantage of being
similar to an approach courts already accept.159 Under this approach the surrogacy contract functions as an agreement akin to one agreed upon in a custody dispute. If two potentially fit parents can agree that it is best for the
child if primary custody is vested in a particular person, it should not matter
that such an agreement is reached prior to birth or even conception of that
child.
VI. CONCLUSION
Parenthood is the single most life-changing event most people will experience. It is fundamentally unfair that some are incapable of experiencing
the birth of their own child. Surrogacy provides a partial solution to the
problem. By choosing a method of enforcement for surrogacy contracts and
applying it equally, no matter the type, states go a long way toward assisting
their citizens in preparing for and eventually having families. Recognizing
that there is no perfect solution that will eliminate all problems associated
with surrogacy contracts, states should take the balanced approach of substantial enforcement articulated in Rosecky. By utilizing the substantial enforcement method described in this note, courts can safeguard the interests
of the child and protect the unique interests of the surrogate, while still giving effect to the intent of the parties and the expectation of the intended parents. However, states can only accomplish these goals if they enforce traditional and gestational contracts equally.
Equal enforcement of both traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts under the substantial enforcement model as applied by the Rosecky
court safeguards the interest of the child by not terminating the surrogate’s
parental rights automatically, leaving a final determination for the court. A
presumption in favor of the intended parents adds stability for the child in
early life by shortening litigation and awarding custody to the intended parents who desired the child from the beginning. Finally, the surrogate will
retain standing to challenge the intended parents if she believes they are
unfit.
Equal enforcement protects the surrogate by increasing her choice in
how invasive a procedure she desires and providing a greater knowledge of
159. Wesley Mack Bryant, Solomon’s New Sword: Tennessee’s Parenting Plan, The Role
of Attorneys, and the Care Perspective, 70 TENN. L. REV. 221, 227 (2002) (noting that courts
in Tennessee usually accept agreed parenting plans without much review because they assume an agreed plan is in the best interest of the child).
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how courts will adjudicate a potential dispute. If both types of contracts are
enforceable, then she may choose what she is willing to put her body
through for the sake of the surrogacy agreement. Additionally, the intended
parents no longer have an incentive to seek out overly disadvantaged women
to serve as surrogates if the jurisdiction enforces both types of contracts
equally. Under the substantial enforcement model, the surrogate in both
types of contracts would not lose parental rights as an operation of law and
could retain those rights if desired.
Finally, the equal enforcement helps intended parents by clearing up
the tangled mess of rules across the various states, or even within their own
state. Intended parents would no longer need to fear losing custody of the
child merely because their DNA is different than the child’s. Even substantial enforcement protects the primary expectation interest of the intended
parents—the ability to take their child home to raise.
It is time for states to decide where they stand on surrogacy generally.
Courts and legislatures must recognize genetics are not a significant enough
factor to warrant treating the contracts differently. Substantial enforcement
as articulated in this note provides a solution that addresses the problems
associated with surrogacy. This approach would allow states to fashion a
rule that enforces both kinds of contracts while balancing the interests of all
parties involved.
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